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I.  INTRODUCTION
Policymakers have long recognized the fundamental role of the
private sector in economic development.  At the same time, public
concern about environmental issues like clean drinking water, over-
consumption of natural resources, and worldwide loss of tropical for-
ests has grown explosively and led policymakers to devote more at-
tention to these issues.  To reconcile these seemingly competing
agendas, governments, the private sector, and the public at large are
increasingly seeking ways to advance natural resource conservation
and economic development as partners.  This article explores the use
of economic incentives and legal tools to achieve that goal.
A leading political opportunity to create economic incentives is
currently at hand.  Many nations are considering ways to implement
the Convention on Biological Diversity, now ratified by over 160
countries.1  Article 11 of the Convention requires countries to create
economically and socially sound incentives for conservation.2  It is
hoped that this paper will give policymakers, private sector represen-
tatives, and the public at large new ideas about how to make eco-
nomic incentives work for biodiversity conservation.
Events like the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the largest
gathering of heads of state in history, testify to intensified concern
about the impact of human activities on essential natural resources.
Celebrations of Earth Day continue to grow in visibility and build
awareness of environmental issues.  Problems like the loss of global
biodiversity have become more concrete to the average citizen.  In-
vestments in biodiversity conservation are increasingly recognized as
investments in avoiding disease, maintaining global climatic systems,
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protecting agriculture, and reducing the political and social stresses
caused by populations that lack natural resources and viable liveli-
hoods.  These considerations are of particular importance to devel-
oping countries rich in biological resources.
This growing awareness of the importance of biodiversity con-
servation indicates that ignoring these issues is no longer a rational
economic choice for the private sector.  Business must address the
link between economic and environmental issues, not only because
governments may force them to do so, but also because consumers
demand it directly.  Witness the shift in preferences toward “green”
products.  Consumers—whose force will grow as markets become in-
creasingly global—are pushing businesses to contribute to environ-
mental protection.  In the face of these trends, blending conservation
and development has become increasingly important.
In the early days of environmental protection, partnerships be-
tween business and environmental interests were usually forced.
Governments and environmental activists viewed strict regulation as
the only way to achieve environmental goals.  In the conservation
field, the aim was to place certain critical natural areas outside of the
reach of development and carefully monitor resource uses like min-
ing, logging, and agriculture.  While these approaches remain a cor-
nerstone of conservation policy, there is a growing movement toward
using economic incentives to help accomplish environmental goals.
The challenge is to craft such incentives to encourage the private sec-
tor to conserve resources while still achieving sustainable economic
development.
Economic incentives as a method of encouraging private sector
involvement are advantageous as they can accomplish major conser-
vation actions at a lower cost than traditional approaches.  Govern-
ment expenditures for strict regulation of land use or the purchase
and management of protected areas can be prohibitively high, par-
ticularly in developing countries.  While tax incentives for conserva-
tion may reduce government revenues slightly in the short run, in the
long run, the overall economy benefits from resulting resource con-
servation.  For example, conservation incentives can promote sus-
tainable economic activities such as ecologically sound tourism and
recreation that might otherwise be foreclosed.
This paper presents an introduction to economic incentives for
the conservation of biodiversity.3  It is intended for use by govern-
3. See generally CYRILLE DE KLEMM & CLARE SHINE, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
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ment and private sector representatives who wish to design and im-
plement policies that encourage private sector participation in con-
servation activities.  Part II outlines the legal mechanisms that allow
private actors to support conservation.  Part III reviews the types of
tax policies that can reward landowners for using these conservation
mechanisms.  Part IV discusses several other economic instruments,
such as user fees and performance bonds, and also notes opportuni-
ties to eliminate “perverse” incentives that encourage destruction of
biodiversity.  Part V includes a list of recommendations intended to
distill some of the ideas presented.
II. LEGAL TOOLS FOR PRIVATE CONSERVATION
There are several important legal tools that private actors can
use to accomplish conservation. The simplest and most obvious is a
gift of land, money, or securities to a conservation organization or
government agency.  A second approach is the “conservation ease-
ment,” a tool for permanently conserving land by restricting most
forms of new development while allowing landowners to use it for
limited purposes consistent with conservation.  A third tool is the
conservation agreement, in which a landowner keeps full ownership
of the land, but enters into a legal contract with a government agency
or a conservation organization in which the owner commits to man-
age the land so as to ensure conservation.  Finally, exchanges of pub-
lic and private land can involve the private sector in conservation and
allow efficient use of government resources.  To increase the incen-
tive for conservation, these legal tools are often combined with tax
policies that encourage their use.  As Part III explains, governments
can design tax policies that reduce the tax burden on private actors
who engage in environmental protection and biodiversity conserva-
tion.
A. Donations
Gifts of land to conservation organizations or government agen-
cies that are committed to protecting the land in perpetuity are one
obvious way for private parties to support conservation.  Donations
of money or securities to conservation organizations can also help
promote conservation.  To make this technique meaningful, the re-
CONSERVATION AND THE LAW: LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVING SPECIES AND
ECOSYSTEMS (1993); DANA CLARK & DAVID DOWNES, WHAT PRICE BIODIVERSITY?:
ECONOMIC INCENTIVE AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1995).
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cipient of a donation of land or money must clearly be capable of car-
rying out effective conservation activities.  If the government encour-
ages such donations through tax incentives, it should also create
mechanisms to ensure that the tax benefits are available only for do-
nations to qualified conservation organizations.
B. Conservation Easements
An “easement” is a property concept that originated in common
law systems.4  If a piece of property is subject to an easement, the
owner is not the only person who has rights to the property; limited
aspects of the ownership rights are held by the owner of the ease-
ment.5  Creation of an easement is possible in most common law
countries because property ownership is understood to consist of a
bundle of rights, many of which are independent of one another. Be-
cause they are independent, these rights can be sold or granted indi-
vidually, as through easements.6
Essentially, a conservation easement sets apart the right to en-
gage in certain types of land use -- such as intensive development --
from the other ownership rights over a specific parcel of land.7  Ac-
tivities covered by the easement may be exercised only by the holder
of the easement.  However, the property owner continues to own title
to the land and can use it for limited purposes that do not interfere
with the easement.8
Once created, easements “run with the land” and bind future
owners of the primary interest in the land.9  In other words, if the
owner transfers title to the land, future owners are also bound by the
easement’s limitation.  This permanency is an important advantage of
easements.
Conservation easements became practicable only when common
law jurisdictions made changes in the historic concept of easements.
Originally, easements by definition benefited one parcel of land, the
“dominant tenement,” by burdening another, the “servient tene-
ment.” An easement could exist only if there were both a dominant
and servient tenement adjacent to one another.10  The classic type of
4. See DE KLEMM & SHINE, supra note 3, at 172.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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easement is a “right of way,” in which the owner of the dominant
tenement has the right to traverse the adjacent servient tenement.11 A
significant change occurred when common law jurisdictions began to
eliminate the requirement of a dominant tenement adjacent to the
servient tenement.12  As a result, conservation organizations and pri-
vate landowners could advance conservation goals by designing
easements that are not connected to any other parcel of land.
In most jurisdictions, a conservation easement is created when
the landowner transfers some or all rights to develop the property to
a government agency or qualified conservation non-governmental
organization (NGO);13 the landowner can maintain certain uses but
cannot legally take actions inconsistent with the terms of the conser-
vation easement.  The government agency or conservation organiza-
tion, as owner of the easement, has the legal right to block incom-
patible uses of the land.14 For the conservation easement to be
effective, the agency or organization must be committed to monitor-
ing the use of the land and protecting the conservation purpose of the
easement in perpetuity.
Conservation easements are used in many common law jurisdic-
tions, including over thirty states in the United States15 as well as a
growing number of provinces in Canada.16  For example, Minnesota
has provided for the establishment of permanent easements protect-
ing wetlands.17  Massachusetts authorizes the creation of conservation
restrictions, including easements, that limit land use.18  Local govern-
ments are authorized by statute to acquire such easements.19  Legisla-
tion requires judicial enforcement of such conservation restrictions
where they are held by a local authority and approved by the state
11. See id.
12. See id. at 172, 242; see also Daniel C. Stockford, Property Tax Assessment of Conser-
vation Easements, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 823, 824 (1990).
13. In theory, private individuals could purchase conservation easements as well, but they
would not receive any favorable tax treatment for doing so because relevant tax policies limit
the types of easement holders that can receive tax benefits.  See discussion infra  Part III of tax
incentives for easement.
14. See DE KLEMM & SHINE, supra note 3, at 172.
15. See Stockford, supra note 12, at 824 (listing states with legislation authorizing conser-
vation easements).
16. See DE KLEMM & SHINE, supra note 3, at 243-44 (summarizing recent survey of Cana-
dian provinces).
17. See MINN. STAT. §§ 103F.515, 103F.516 (1997).  Minnesota also provides that land
subject to such an easement is exempt from property taxation.  See id. § 272.02.
18. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 31 (1996).
19. See id. ch. 40, § 8C.
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government, and where they are held by a non-profit conservation
organization and approved by the local and state authorities.20
Conservation easements are valuable because they allow private
citizens to take an active role in protecting their lands.  Government
funding is an important way to support and promote the use of ease-
ments.  In the United States, for instance, the federal government fa-
cilitates conservation of wetlands through the Wetlands Reserve Pro-
gram.  The program is designed to “assist owners of eligible lands in
restoring and protecting wetlands” by allowing the Department of
Agriculture to purchase conservation easements.21  The owner must
grant an easement of at least 30 years, a permanent easement, or an
easement lasting the maximum amount of time allowed by state law.22
The owner must also agree to implement a wetland conservation
plan.23  Compensation is based on the difference in fair market value
of the land before and after the easement is recorded.24  There are
also provisions for cost sharing and technical assistance.25 Other states
in the U.S. have similar programs to purchase easements on wet-
lands.26
As with other property rights, conservation easements may be
either donated or sold.  The sale of a conservation easement is an at-
tractive option from the owner’s perspective because, in addition to
receiving the negotiated purchase price for the value of the easement,
the owner continues to own and use the property for all purposes
compatible with the easement.  The restrictions contained in the
easement often benefit the owner and reflect his or her desires for
the long-term use of the land.27
Purchasing conservation easements at their market price is less
attractive from the perspective of conservation groups due to limited
funding.  To encourage donations of conservation easements, a num-
ber of jurisdictions specifically provide that a conservation easement
qualifies as a charitable contribution, enabling a landowner to deduct
its value from her taxable income.28  Furthermore, tax laws in some
jurisdictions provide that the transfer of a conservation easement re-
20. See id. ch. 184, § 32.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 3837, 3837a (1994).
22. See id. § 3837a(e).
23. See id. § 3837a(a).
24. See id. § 3837a(f).
25. See id. § 3837c.
26. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 103F.515 subd. 3, 6 (1997).
27. See DE KLEMM & SHINE, supra note 3, at 172.
28. See id. at 245.
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sults in a lower property tax valuation for the owner  recognizing that
limiting the use of the property reduces its fair market value.29  Thus,
properly designed tax policies can vastly increase the benefits to a
donor granting conservation easements.  (These policies are detailed
further in Part III, below.)
Permanent conservation easements are currently not considered
possible in many civil law jurisdictions. Civil law typically requires
the existence of a dominant and servient tenement, with the holder of
the dominant tenement retaining ownership of a partial property
right such as an easement.30  Further, civil law may require that domi-
nant and servient tenements be contiguous.31  However, certain ex-
ceptions are being developed in a number of jurisdictions.32 Modifica-
tions in national legislation or creative use of existing concepts in civil
law countries to accommodate conservation easements could be a
bold step forward for conservation, with both private actors and the
public being able to enjoy the benefits.
In Switzerland, the Civil Code provisions related to easements
do not require that the dominant and the servient tenements be con-
tiguous.33  Additionally, the 1966 Swiss Act for the Conservation of
Nature and Landscape (currently under revision) explicitly provides
for voluntary agreements between a governmental agency (or a pri-
vate association) and a landowner in order to create a conservation
easement.34  To date, conservation easements in Switzerland have
been used primarily to protect agricultural lands.35
In Germany, the Civil Code allows the establishment of a
“limited servitude” (“Beschränte Persönliche Dientbarkeit”) on a
piece of land, for the benefit of persons, organizations, or the State,
in a way that can (1) relinquish the owner/user’s rights to use the land
or a portion of it, and (2) allow the easement’s beneficiary to use the
land within specific limitations.36  A “Limited Personal Servitude” can
have an economic or non-economic purpose. The only requirement
29. See Stockford, supra note 12, at 845.
30. See DE KLEMM & SHINE, supra note 3, at 244.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. CC arts. 730.2, 731.1, 733, 738.1.
34. Interview with Mr. Roger Zusserey, Ministère de l’Environnement, des Forêts et du
Paysage (May 8, 1995)
35. See id.
36. See DAVID D. GREGORY, THE EASEMENT AS A CONSERVATION TECHNIQUE app. II at
44-45 (1972).
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of the German Civil Code is that the purpose of the agreement must
be clearly defined.37
However, German organizations wanting to acquire limited
land-use rights to achieve conservation goals continue to face legal
obstacles.  One problem is that the personal servitude is inalienable
and non-transferable, and expires when the assignee institution is dis-
solved.38  This difficulty is complicated by laws which provide for the
expiration of the personal servitude in case of a forced sale initiated
by creditors whose claim was recorded prior to the servitude.39 These
obstacles can be addressed and overcome, but to date they have ap-
peared to prevent the widespread use of conservation easements in
Germany.
In Costa Rica, the notion of conservation easements was recog-
nized when the Public Registry recently adopted a new code, the
“GF3,” specifically for conservation easements.40  Under the new
regulations, these easements are temporary or permanent land use
limitations imposed by private landowners.41  While some of the
landowners receive compensation by selling such easements, others
create them to increase the value of their real estate or to promote
conservation.42
One example is the conservation easement recently created near
the Monteverde Cloud Forest National Park in Costa Rica.  This
agreement between The Nature Conservancy and the Tropical Sci-
ence Center protects 42 acres of land, including migratory habitat for
the Quetzal, which uses this area as a stopping point, feeding on the
Aguacatillo tree endemic to the area.43  Another example is the
Braulio Carrillo National Park, where a tract of land abutting the
Park is covered by an easement.44  Under the terms of the easement, a
private company is allowed to operate a cable car for tourists pro-
viding an aerial view of the rain forest and adjacent park.  While it
provides revenue for the park, the easement serves an additional con-
37. See id at 44.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Lic. Augustin Atmetlla, Manual de Instrumentos Juridicos Privados para la Pro-
teccion de los Recursos Naturales II-2 (1995).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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servation benefit by setting limits on foot traffic near the cable car in
order to reduce the damaging ecological impact to the area.45
Another legal tool in common law jurisdictions similar to the
easement is the covenant.  This special type of property contract is
permanent and binds future owners, like an easement.46  It is used
most often between private parties such as real estate developers and
home-buyers.  In this situation, the agreement by which an owner
transfers title (or transfers a lease to a tenant) can include a covenant
that imposes conditions on the use of the land.  These conditions also
bind future owners of the land and can be used for conservation pur-
poses.47 Governments could encourage the creative use of covenants
to protect greenspace or trees in suburban areas.  Commentators
have observed, however, that some civil law jurisdictions may not
permit contracts that bind future owners.48
C. Conservation Agreements
Another widely used mechanism for private conservation is the
conservation agreement.  In a conservation agreement, the owner
makes a legal agreement to manage the property to accomplish a de-
fined environmental or conservation goal, but does not transfer an
ownership right.49  It may be possible to design conservation agree-
ments for immediate use in jurisdictions where conservation ease-
ments are not possible because laws have not yet been revised to
permit their use.  Conservation agreements are becoming increas-
ingly important in a growing number of jurisdictions.50
In a conservation agreement, the landowner agrees to manage
his property according to specific terms, in exchange for payments
from a government agency.51  For example, a farm owner might agree
not to disturb native vegetation, or to adjust the harvest cycle to ac-
count for habitat needs of native animals or birds.  In order to maxi-
45. See id.
46. See John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for Land Preser-
vation, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 319, 330-31 (1997).  Traditionally, covenants included in the instrument
for land sales were “restrictive,” limiting the activities of the purchaser; covenants included in
leases, on the other hand, could impose positive obligations on the purchaser.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See CYRILLE DE KLEMM & CLARE SHINE,  THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
HABITATS OUTSIDE PROTECTED AREAS:  A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND ITALY (PART II, FRANCE) 245 (1993).
50. See id.
51. See id.
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mize the effectiveness of such arrangements, governments usually
make periodic payments rather than a lump sum payment.  Such a
system maintains the financial incentive for the landowner to con-
tinue compliance.  Governments can also encourage owners to form
and comply with conservation agreements by creating tax incentives,
as discussed in Part III below.
Unlike easements, conservation agreements generally last only
for a specified period of time, after which they must be renewed if the
land is to remain protected.  Also in contrast to easements, conserva-
tion agreements do not qualify as transfers of property for purposes
of the charitable contribution deduction.52  Furthermore, they gener-
ally will not result in a lower property tax assessment, because they
are not usually permanent.  Nevertheless, governments could design
income and property tax policies that treat owners favorably when
they enter into conservation agreements.
While conservation agreements typically bind only the current
landowner, a growing number of jurisdictions provide for conserva-
tion agreements that bind future as well as current owners.  In the
United Kingdom, for example, management agreements between the
government and holders of National Nature Reserves and Sites of
Special Scientific Interest are generally defined as “contracts in rem,
which run with the land,” enforceable against those who succeed the
current owner.53  Similarly, Australia54 and Queensland55 have passed
legislation authorizing the government to form conservation agree-
ments with landowners in certain areas restricting land use or re-
quiring conservation actions.  These agreements can also apply to the
owners’ successors in interest.56
Conservation agreements have the drawback of usually requiring
continued government expenditures and supervision.  In addition, an
owner with no intention of developing his land might sign an agree-
ment merely restricting development to receive payments.57  While
landowners should be encouraged to promote conservation, govern-
ments can ensure that expenditures have an added impact by requir-
52. See id.
53. See CYRILLE DE KLEMM & CLARE SHINE,  THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
HABITATS OUTSIDE PROTECTED AREAS:  A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND ITALY (PART I, UNITED KINGDOM) 50 (1993).
54. See Endangered Species Protection Act, §§ 50-55, 4 Austl. Acts 194 (1992).
55. See Nature Conservation Act, § 41, 1 Queensl. Acts 20 (1992).
56. See Endangered Species Protection Act, 1992, pt. 4 (Austl.); Nature Conservation Act,
1992, pt. 4 (Queensl.).
57. See DE KLEMM & SHINE,  supra  note 53, at 31, 50.
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ing an owner to take positive steps, in addition to merely avoiding de-
structive activity, to qualify for payments under a conservation
agreement.
Many jurisdictions have programs to support conservation
agreements.  Switzerland, for example, allows government payments
to farmers who maintain meadows and grasslands in their natural
condition.58  In order to receive the payments (considered compensa-
tion for ecological services performed in the public interest), the
farmers must agree not to graze animals or drain, irrigate, or fertilize
these areas.59  Liechtenstein sponsors a similar program.60
In the United States, the Conservation Reserve Program
(“CRP”), enacted as part of the 1985 Farm Bill, is a voluntary pro-
gram which encourages farmers of highly erodible crop lands to es-
tablish and maintain soil-conserving ground covers (such as trees or
grasses) for a ten-year contract period61 in exchange for periodic gov-
ernment payments.62  The goals of the CRP program are: to reduce
water and wind erosion and sedimentation; to improve water quality;
to create better habitat for fish and wildlife through improved food
and cover; to protect the nation’s long-term capability to produce
food and fiber; to curb production of surplus commodities; and to
provide needed income support for farmers.63
D. Land Exchanges
Land exchanges can also support conservation while minimizing
government expenditures.  Such exchanges between the government
and private parties can conserve biologically valuable land through
public ownership.  In addition, conservation groups can use ex-
changes between private parties as tools to accomplish conservation.
In the United States, the Department of the Interior has the
power to make land exchanges under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (“FLPMA”).64  The Department can exchange
58. See DE KLEMM & SHINE, supra note 3, at 247 (citing ORDONNANCE INSTITUANT DES
CONTRIBUTIONS A L’EXPLOITATION DU SOL DANS DES CONDITIONS DIFFICILES ET POUR DES
PRESTATIONS DE CARACTERE ECOLOGIQUE, 20 Decembre 1989).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-32 (1994).
62. See id. §§ 3833-34.
63. See 7 C.F.R. § 704.1(b) (1997).
64. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994) (declaring that it is United States policy to transfer and
acquire federal lands, through land exchange and other means, in order to serve the national
interest, including protecting the quality of ecological, environmental, and scientific values).
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publicly owned land for private land of comparable market value in
order to serve the public welfare.65  In this way, the government can
acquire land of significant biological value owned by a private actor
in exchange for publicly owned land of perhaps less biological value
but of value to a private landholder.  For example, in 1988 an Ameri-
can company transferred 100,000 acres of ecologically rich land in
Florida to the government in exchange for 100 acres of commercially
valuable real estate in downtown Phoenix, Arizona.66
Carefully designed land exchanges provide governments with an
efficient means of accomplishing public interest conservation goals,
while allowing private actors to advance private economic goals.  To
be successful, a land exchange policy or program must include: (1) a
procedure for ensuring that the land to be acquired is valuable for
conservation; and (2) a procedure for ensuring that the government
negotiates a reasonable bargain and does not accept too little in ex-
change for public lands.  To be effective, these procedures must in-
volve expert assessment, public participation, and judicial review of
the agency decision-making process.
III. TAX INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION
Tax law is crucial to implementing the legal tools described
above, because it provides important incentives to private actors to
initiate conservation activities.  This section discusses some specific
tax policies that encourage private support of conservation.
A. Income Tax Deduction
To create support of non-governmental conservation organiza-
tions or initiatives, one of the single most important steps govern-
ments can take is to create a positive tax climate for conservation.  In
Germany, a taxpayer can deduct the value of a charitable donation
from taxable income up to a ceiling amount.67  To be eligible, the do-
nation must be given to an environmental organization or to the
65. See id. § 1716 (establishing criteria and procedures for exchanges of public lands or
lands within the National Forest System and private lands when such and exchange is in the
public interest, considering a range of needs, including recreation and fish and wildlife).
66. See Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and Takings: A Call for Innovation
Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 365 (1994) (citing Land Exchange Agreement
between the United States of America and the Barron Collier Company, dated May 12, 1988,
on file with Department of the Interior).
67. See Friedrich Von Zezschwitz, Environmental Taxes in Germany, in TAXATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: A MULTINATIONAL LEGAL STUDY 65, 91 (Sanford E. Gaines
& Richard A. Westin eds., 1991).
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states, districts, communities, or their agencies in order to promote
protection of the environment, the landscape, or ancient monu-
ments.68  Similarly, the United States allows for a federal income tax
deduction for qualified charitable contributions up to a maximum
ceiling of 30 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.69  These
tax code provisions are a valuable incentive, encouraging millions of
donors to donate funds to non-profit organizations, including conser-
vation groups.70
1. Contribution of Land
Donation of land can be a very important conservation tool. Tax
policies of some countries encourage such donations by specifying
that donations of land can qualify for the charitable contribution in-
come tax deduction.  In the United States, the tax code specifies that
a person contributing qualified real property to a qualified organiza-
tion exclusively for conservation purposes can deduct the value of the
property interest from taxable income as a charitable contribution up
to the ceiling amount.71  This provision has proven to be a significant
incentive for conservation of biodiversity.
As a practical matter, in the United States a donor can often ob-
tain more favorable tax treatment by directly donating real property
rather than donating cash.72  For example, if a donor sells a piece of
property, intending to donate the proceeds, normal income tax or
capital gains tax apply to returns from the sale, thus diminishing both
the funds available for the donation and the resulting value of the tax
deduction.73 However, if the donor contributes the property directly,
the full value of the property is deductible (up to the ceiling amount)
and capital gains taxes are avoided.74  Furthermore, where the prop-
erty has appreciated in value, the donor can deduct the appreciated
value, rather than the original purchase price, and thereby qualify for
a substantial deduction while avoiding capital gains taxes.75  Under
68. See id at 91.
69. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1994).  The amount of a contribution exceeding 30 percent of the
adjusted gross income in a given year can, however, be carried over and deducted over the next
five years.  See id.
70. See Von Zezschwitz, supra note 67, at 91.
71. See 26 U.S.C. § 170.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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U.S. law, charitable donations of both cash and certain types of prop-
erty are tax deductible.
2. Contribution of Conservation Easement
Another tax policy that increases the incentives for donors to
support conservation is one that allows donations of conservation
easements to qualify as charitable contributions that are deductible
from taxable income.  Federal law in the United States provides that,
in general, a property donor must convey his entire interest in a
property to qualify for the charitable contribution deduction.76  How-
ever, an exception exists for a qualified conservation interest that is
deductible as a charitable contribution, even though it is only a par-
tial interest in real estate.77  A qualified conservation interest is de-
fined as an interest in real estate given in perpetuity for the purposes
of land preservation, public education or recreation, protection of a
natural habitat, preservation of open space, or pursuant to govern-
ment conservation policy.78  Thus, the donation of a conservation
easement is deductible as a charitable gift as long as the easement is
solely for conservation purposes and is given to a qualified conserva-
tion organization or public agency.79  Conservation easements can
also reduce property taxes, as discussed in Part III.C below.
B. Tax Deductions for Certain Types of Land Use
Another possible tax measure encouraging conservation of re-
sources is to allow deductions from taxable income of expenses that
landowners incur in taking specified measures for conservation.  In
the United States, farmers may deduct the costs of soil and water
conservation measures from their taxable income.80  To qualify, such
expenses must be incurred in the process of carrying out a soil con-
servation plan approved either by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service
or a comparable state agency, and must not involve the dredging or
filling of wetlands.81  The deduction is limited annually to 25 percent
of the taxpayer’s gross income from farming; any expenses above this
limit can be carried over to succeeding tax years without time limita-
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See 26 U.S.C. § 175(a) (1994).
81. See id. § 175(c)(3).
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tion.82  In another example, Italy’s Protected Areas Act provides that
non-commercial organizations may deduct from taxable income any
expenses incurred in maintaining and protecting property that is
within a natural area designated for protection under other conserva-
tion laws.83
C. Tax Exemptions
A variation on the idea of a tax deduction is the tax exemption.
In addition to making donations or certain expenditures deductible
from taxable income, governments can encourage conservation by
exempting certain activities or property devoted to certain purposes
from taxation.84  Examples include income and sales tax exemptions
on qualified non-profit organizations and property and estate tax ex-
emptions, discussed below.
1. Property Tax Exemptions and Reductions
Some governments have tax policies that reduce or eliminate
property taxes on land of ecological significance if the owner agrees
to manage the land for conservation purposes.85  In addition, govern-
ments can provide property tax incentives for transfers of conserva-
tion easements by recognizing the transfer of a conservation ease-
ment as a reduction in the value of the property for tax assessment
purposes.  (This incentive supplements the incentive provided by the
income tax deduction described in Part III.A.2 above.)
a. Tax Exemptions
Tax exemptions have been instituted in some U.S. states and in
the Canadian province of Ontario.86  In Minnesota, undisturbed wet-
lands and ungrazed native prairie are exempt from state property
taxes.87  However, to qualify as a wetland and receive such an exemp-
tion, the land must be “usable for farming but restricted to uses en-
82. See id. § 175(b).
83. See CYRILLE DE KLEMM & CLARE SHINE,  THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
HABITATS OUTSIDE PROTECTED AREAS:  A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND ITALY (PART III, ITALY) 54 (1993).
84. Preferential tax treatment of socially desirable activity is the ideal policy.  In practice,
however, preferential tax treatment is often accorded to activities benefiting politically power-
ful interests that sometimes have large social and environmental costs.  See infra Part III.H.
85. See DE KLEMM & SHINE, supra note 3, at 241; see also Stockford, supra note 12, at 844-
45.
86. See id.
87. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 272.02(10), (11) (West Supp. 1998).
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compassing wildlife or water conservation purposes,” and it must be
“preserved in its natural condition.”88  The Commissioner of the De-
partment of Natural Resources must certify that a property qualifies
as native prairie before the tax authority will grant a native prairie
exemption.89
Brazil provides a property tax exemption to encourage the crea-
tion of reserves on private lands.90  By Decree No. 98,914 of January
1990, the President gave the power to regulate protected reserves to
the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Resources
(IBAMA), a government agency.91  Under the authority granted by
the decree, IBAMA has the power to declare private lands as special
natural patrimony reserves, where they are identified as having bio-
logical or scenic value.92  Hunting, fishing, capturing animals, burning,
and deforestation are banned within the protected reserves.93  In ad-
dition, Article 3º(e) of Law 4771, the Brazilian Forestry Code, defines
lands that may be protected, including lands of scientific, historic or
exceptional aesthetic value. Private lands so designated are exempt
from federal tax.94  However, poor enforcement of use restrictions is a
serious problem.
In Guatemala, businesses or individuals may designate a portion
of their property as a private natural reserve.95  Property owners who
do so are exempt from property taxes on the portion of land so des-
ignated.96  In order to qualify for the exemption, the owner must
manage the reserve according to the established requirements, and
the reserves must be recognized by the government.97  However, this
law has had little practical impact as tax collection has not been strict.
Thus, there is no significant difference in actual tax treatment of pro-
tected areas and unprotected areas, providing little incentive to take
88. Id. § 272.02(10).
89. See id. § 272.02(11).
90. See Programa de Reserva Particular do Patrimônio Natural (RPPN) Decreto No.
98.914 de 31 de Janiero de 1990, Art. 1º.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at Art. 5º.
94. Colentânea da Legislação Federal de Meio Ambiente, Brasília: Instituto Brasileiro do
Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Natruais Renováveis 1992, Lei. 4,771 de 15 de Setembro de
1965, Art. 3º (e), 18 § 2º .
95. See Decreto 4/89, Ley de Areas Protegidas, Art. 31 (published by CONAP: Consejo
Nacional de Areas Protegidas).  In practice, the regulatory agency, CONAP, reportedly visits
the site before approving the designation
96. See id.
97. See id.
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advantage of the exemption.  Efforts to strengthen tax enforcement
might therefore result in both fiscal and conservation benefits.
b. Tax Reductions
A number of jurisdictions in the United States have recognized
that land has reduced market value when subject to an easement re-
stricting development and have therefore provided lower taxes on
land burdened by a conservation easement.  As a result, property
taxes (usually assessed and collected by a local government rather
than the federal government) may diminish commensurately; indeed,
many jurisdictions have explicitly provided for this in legislation.98
Thus, in addition to obtaining a federal income tax deduction, prop-
erty owners can significantly decrease their property and estate taxes
while retaining ownership of their property by granting conservation
easements during their lifetime.  The federal income tax deduction
and estate tax reduction also apply if an easement is donated through
a decedent’s will.99
2. Exemption from Estate Taxes
In many countries, the government imposes a tax on the transfer
of wealth from a decedent to his or her heirs or assigns. This estate
tax is generally assessed based on the fair market value of property in
the estate.100  In many cases, the tax burden imposed by taxing land at
the fair market value forces heirs to sell the land to pay the taxes,
particularly if the family is rich in land, but poor in cash.101  In part,
this is because fair market value is often defined as the value of the
land converted to the highest and best use (i.e. the most intensive de-
velopment).  A number of governments are modifying this policy to
discourage the subdivision and development of biologically valuable
lands, and to protect family landholdings.
The United Kingdom, for example, provides an exemption from
estate tax for land the government determines is “of outstanding sce-
nic or historic or scientific interest.”102  This land is exempt from es-
98. See Stockford, supra note 12, at 830-31.  Because of the complexity involved in prop-
erty valuation, however, it may be difficult to predict precisely the tax benefits of a given ease-
ment.  See id.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 2031(a) (1994).
101. In countries like the United States that allow conservation easements, an owner may
reduce the tax burden on heirs by transferring a conservation easement during their lifetime.
After the owner’s death, the estate’s value will be lower, reflecting the lower value of the land.
102. Inheritance Tax Act of 1984, § 26.
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tate taxation if transferred to a non-profit organization that is “an
appropriate one to be responsible for the preservation of its charac-
ter.”103  The government may also require the formation of a contract
that establishes rules for use of the land as a condition of claiming the
exemption.104
In another example from the United Kingdom, the value of
standing timber on property within the estate is exempt as long as it
is not cut and sold.105  This reduces the fiscal incentive for heirs to cut
and sell timber to pay inheritance taxes.  Such a policy, if applied in a
country with old-growth forests, could act as an incentive to conserve
biodiversity.
In the United States, estate taxes may be reduced if a will pro-
vides for the donation of an easement to a conservation organiza-
tion.106  After the owner’s death, the easement is transferred accord-
ing to the terms of the will.107  The value of the estate is reduced
accordingly, thus reducing estate taxes.108  Owners can also accom-
plish the same reduction in total estate value by transferring the
easement before death.  Recent reforms in the tax law create addi-
tional incentives. An example is allowing an exclusion of 40% of the
value of land subject to a conservation easement from the value of an
estate for federal tax purposes even when the heirs of the decedent-
owner authorize the exclusion.109
IV. OTHER INSTRUMENTS
The preceding discussion focused on government policies spe-
cifically designed to create incentives for private actors to conserve
biodiversity.  There are also a broad array of less direct options to
encourage the conservation and sustainable use of resources.  In this
section, we present a subset of these additional options which are
most directly related to biodiversity conservation.
A. Tax Allocation
The allocation of tax revenues collected at the state or national
level can be designed to encourage conservation.  While this method
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at §§ 125, 126.
106. See 26 U.S.C. § 2031(a) (1994).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. § 2031(c).
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is not directly a private sector incentive, such allocation regimes can
help ameliorate the loss to the local property tax base which often re-
sults from the establishment of conservation easements or other tax
incentives for conservation (since such measures reduce the assessed
value of the affected real property).  Tax allocation arrangements can
help to encourage municipalities to undertake conservation meas-
ures, by helping to compensate for loss of revenue.
Two Brazilian states, Sâo Paulo and Parana, have passed laws
that allocate a proportionally larger share of state tax revenues to
municipalities with protected areas.110  A small fraction -- 5 percent in
Parana and 0.5 percent in Sâo Paulo -- of the state value-added tax
imposed on most goods and services, is reserved for municipalities
that protect environmentally significant areas.111  The environmen-
tally adjusted allocation compensates localities for removing areas
from economic activity, thus creating an incentive to protect existing
reserves and to create new ones.  In Parana, $19 million is expected
to be distributed this year among 150 municipalities, and in Sâo Paulo
$1 million will be split 115 ways.112  The difference is most influential
on towns with small budgets.  For example, in Sâo Paulo , the town of
Barra do Jurvo increased revenues from the state value added tax by
522 percent after the protected areas-based tax allocation scheme was
put in place.113
To maximize the effectiveness of tax revenue distribution as a
conservation tool, guidelines must be narrowly drawn so that the
number of beneficiaries is limited and the payments sufficiently large
to reward local governments at least in part for foregoing short-term
economic development and to compensate for the costs associated
with land management.  Another option to enhance the effectiveness
of such programs is to increase the percentage allocated to qualifying
municipalities once the programs have been shown to achieve the de-
sired goals.
B. User Fees To Support Conservation
The exploitation of natural resources often results in environ-
mental costs in the form of damages to natural resources and loss of
110. See Estado do Sao Paulo, Lei Estadual No. 8,510, 29 de Dezembro de 1993, Art. 1º
(VI) e Anexo; Estado do Parana, Lei Complementar No. 059/91, Decreto 974/91.
111. See id.
112. See Marcus Fernandez, “Imposto Verde” Sextuplica Renda de Cidades, FOLHA DE SAO
PAULO, June 19, 1994.
113. See id.
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biodiversity.114  These costs are often not reflected in the market
prices for the resource.115  Because these damages are external to the
market, the direct user has a financial incentive to avoid incurring the
cost of environmental protection by passing the environmental costs
on to others.  While individuals profit, society as a whole suffers.  An
important method for correcting such market failures is to impose
user taxes or fees on the use of natural resources.  This is particularly
important if the resources are taken from publicly owned lands.  Ide-
ally, the fees imposed should reflect the social and environmental
costs occasioned by the resource use.116  By capturing true costs, user
fees can promote efficient resource use.117
However, user fees should not be the primary source of revenue
for an administering resource agency as the agency may have an eco-
nomic incentive to promote overuse rather than conservation.  In-
stead, user fees should be allocated directly to conservation uses
specified by law, such as the purchase of land or easements for con-
servation, or conservation trust funds that are independent of the fee-
charging agency.
User fees can be used in a variety of ways to assure that resource
users internalize externality costs.  Timber, oil and mining, and rec-
reational user fees are examples of such fees.
1. Timber
Timber extraction is one of the most dramatic causes of biodi-
versity loss.118  One method for capturing at least some of the many
costs of timber extraction is a user fee.  User fees should be carefully
designed and strictly enforced to ensure that they promote conserva-
tion and do not support unsustainable practices.  For example, if the
government places user fees in a fund for reforestation, it must take
great care to ensure that the fund does not have the unintended ef-
fect of encouraging an actor to extract timber from natural areas in
order to get access to reforestation funds.  Furthermore, governments
must ensure that the funds generated by such user fees are utilized
for the purpose intended, and that negotiation, performance, and
payment are transparent to public scrutiny.
114. See, e.g., ROBERT REPETTO, ET AL., GREEN FEES: HOW A TAX SHIFT CAN WORK FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY (1992).
115. See id.
116. See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 7 (1977).
117. See, e.g., REPETTO ET AL., supra note 114.
118. See DIRK BRYANT ET AL., THE LAST FRONTIER FORESTS 5-6, 12 (1997).
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Indonesia’s experience with a reforestation fund provides a clear
example of the difficulties associated with such initiatives.  In Indo-
nesia, the government controls and manages the nation’s forests.119 It
grants applicants concessions in the form of legal rights to exploit
particular forest territories and resources.120 Concessionaires are re-
quired to regenerate or replant the forests in their concession area,
and contribute to the Reforestation Fund the equivalent of US$10.00
(as of 1990) per cubic meter log produced.121  The reforestation fund
is managed by the Ministry of Forestry and is designed to be used to
establish industrial forests and finance replanting activities.122
Several difficulties have arisen.  First, establishment of industrial
forests is not a step toward the promotion of biodiversity conserva-
tion, and can even reduce biodiversity where industrial forests dis-
place natural forests.  Similarly, reforestation of previously degraded
land is at best neutral from a biodiversity conservation perspective if
the land is reforested with a monoculture plantation; to restore at
least some biodiversity, the land should be reforested with native
species.  The Indonesian program has also been criticized by some
observers because a uniform flat tax encourages high-grading and
wastage, and it fails to capture greater revenues from tree species
with higher commercial value.123 A final challenge for resource ex-
traction fees is to insure that the funds are used exclusively for resto-
ration purposes.  In the case of Indonesia, a portion of the fund was
reportedly used to bolster the aviation industry.124 Hence, timber user
fees and forest funds must be carefully designed and closely moni-
tored if they are to be effective incentives for conservation.
2. Oil and Mining
Oil and mineral exploration, development, and transportation
impose heavy environmental costs, including destruction of biodiver-
sity, habitat, and wildlife.  The United States imposes taxes on oil and
coal companies designed to capture some of the externalities associ-
119. See INDONESIAN FORUM FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (WALHI), SUSTAINABILITY AND
ECONOMIC RENT IN THE INDONESIA FORESTRY SECTOR 31-32 (1991).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 32.
123. See id.  Perhaps a better option for maximizing revenue and promoting efficiency
might be an area utilization fee.
124. See Margot Cohen, Culture of Awareness, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Nov. 17, 1994 at
44.
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ated with energy resource development.125  An excise tax of a few
cents per barrel on domestic and imported crude oil and imported pe-
troleum products is paid into the Oil Spill Liability Trust fund.126  The
tax is part of a liability scheme requiring those who conduct this ac-
tivity that threatens the environment, including wildlife, to pay a fee
into a trust fund. Money in the trust fund is then paid out to compen-
sate cleanup costs and damage to natural resources.127
Surface coal mining has a devastating impact on biodiversity,
ecosystems, and local communities.128  In the United States, the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act imposes a tax on coal of
$0.35 per surface ton and $0.15 per subsurface ton, which mining
companies pay into the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund.129  The
fund is intended to finance reclamation of mines, and is paid out only
if no solvent party responsible for an abandoned mine can be lo-
cated.130  As with the Indonesian reforestation fund, a major challenge
has been to maintain adequate enforcement.131  In addition, funds in
the coal mine restoration fund have been redirected for unrelated
purposes, similar to the Indonesian reforestation fund.132
3.  Recreation
Recreation, though not as destructive as extractive resource de-
velopment, has environmental consequences.  Imposing fees for rec-
reational resource use is another method of generating economic
revenues to support conservation.  Such fees often include park ad-
missions fees, backcountry permit fees, and fishing and hunting li-
censing fees.  User fees should reflect the costs of administering rec-
reation programs, maintaining trails and facilities, and enforcing
hunting and fishing regulations.  The imposition of user fees on rec-
reation, particularly on public lands, has led to concern about im-
posing too high a cost for access, thereby excluding poorer persons.
125. At the same time, however, the U.S. encourages exploration and development of oil,
gas, and certain minerals, through preferential tax treatment of certain producers’ revenues.
See CLARK & DOWNES, supra note 3, at 27-28.
126. See 26 U.S.C. § 4611(c)(2) (1994).
127. See id. §§ 4611, 9509.
128. See CLARK & DOWNES, supra note 3, at 20.
129. See Richard A. Westin, Understanding Environmental Taxes, 46 TAX LAW. 327, 353-54
(1993).
130. See id.  See also Keith Schneider, Scars of Mining Endure as Repair Fund Dries Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993 at A9; Ted Williams, Strip-Mine Shell Game, AUDUBON, Nov. 1992
at 48.
131. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 130; Williams, supra note 130.
132. See Schneider, supra note 130.
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This equity concern may limit the extent to which costs can be recov-
ered solely through recreational user fees.
One example demonstrating how the demand for nature tourism
and outdoor recreation might be used to promote conservation goals
through user fees comes from Australia, where the government
charges user fees, leases food outlets, and charges concession fees for
buildings and marinas associated with protected areas.  Reportedly,
companies and private individuals have in turn formed an eco-
tourism association, members of which are required to put back a
certain percentage of revenue into conservation projects.133
C. Controlling Access to Shared Resources
Common property resources are described as resources owned
collectively by the entire community (whether local, national, or
global).134 If they are unregulated, common property resources may
be exploited to the point of exhaustion.135  Individuals reap the entire
benefit when harvesting a common pool resource, but the costs are
shared by the entire community.  Thus, an individual has no incentive
to exercise restraint and conserve the resource, as anything left in the
commons may be taken by someone else.  If private individuals act to
maximize their self interest, a valuable resource will be overex-
ploited; this is commonly referred to as the tragedy of the com-
mons.136  A contemporary example is the North Atlantic fishery of
Georges Bank off Cape Cod; once tremendously productive, it is now
impoverished due to over-fishing.137
Through regulation, the tragedy of the commons can be averted.
The “tragedy” occurs when there is no social method of management.
A number of traditional cultures have managed common property
through community management arrangements, without privatizing
it and without an environmental or social “tragedy.”138  In a number
of countries in the Western Hemisphere, indigenous cultures are sus-
tainably managing property that is held in common.139  In these situa-
133. See Libby Lester, Back to Nature, Again, SUNDAY AGE, Sept. 12, 1993, at Agenda § 9.
134. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in VALUING THE EARTH:
ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 127-142 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds.,
1993).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1994-95 187-190 (1994).
138. See Whose Common Future? Reclaiming the Commons, THE ECOLOGIST 5-6 (1993).
139. See id. at 6-15.
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tions, governments can promote conservation best by helping these
cultures demarcate their lands and enforce the borders against incur-
sions by outsiders who do not follow the communities’ rules of com-
mon property management.
In other cases, it may be useful to assign private property rights
in a resource previously held as common property.  Assigning prop-
erty rights to a limited number of holders, and excluding others from
using the resource, may be beneficial in eliminating overexploitation,
fostering private stewardship, and encouraging sustainable use of tra-
ditional common property resources.140
For example, Iceland uses a combination of regulations and
market incentives to protect eiders, a species of sea bird.141  Eiders are
a traditional source of eggs and feathers.  In the past, they were
treated as a common property resource, and could be hunted freely.
Subject to unchecked exploitation, however, eider populations dwin-
dled.142 To remedy the situation, the government issued regulations
which protected the birds, in part by creating a private property
right.143 The regulations impose an absolute ban on killing eiders and
protect public nesting sites, but allow property owners the right to
collect eggs from nesting sites on private land.144  Property owners, as
the sole legal source of eider eggs, thus have an economic incentive to
protect nests from poachers and predators.  The government enforces
the private property right by imposing substantial penalties on
poachers.145
Privatization alone is rarely a solution.  To be effective, privati-
zation should be combined with regulation of the level of use and ef-
fective enforcement mechanisms.  In fisheries, for instance, some
countries are experimenting with individual transferable quotas
(ITQs), in which a limited number of fishers obtain permits to fish
certain percentages of the total allowable catch (TAC).146  However,
it is generally agreed that ITQs have no inherent conservation bene-
fits; rather, they reduce the overcapitalization of the industry, which
in turn can reduce the political pressure to exceed sustainable
140. See Jon H. Goldstein, The Prospects for Using Market Incentives to Conserve Biologi-
cal Diversity, 21 ENVTL. L. 985, 993 (1991).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See CLARK & DOWNES, supra note 3, at 30.
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yields.147  For conservation, ITQ systems depend on setting a scientifi-
cally valid TAC, and on strict government monitoring and enforce-
ment of each ITQ.148
Colombia’s management of watershed areas is an additional ex-
ample of controlling access to shared resources.149  In 1954, the central
government and the departments that share jurisdiction over the fer-
tile 400,000 hectare Cauca Valley created the Corporation Autonoma
del Valle del Cuaca (CVC), with a primary mandate of planning and
execution of major development projects through integrated man-
agement of the region’s natural resources.150  In the early 1980s, the
CVC began using Watershed User Associations, designed to bring
together water users in the lowlands and communities living in the
highlands.  The CVC created a fund with revenues generated from
user fees based on water use.  The fund compensates upstream users
(primarily subsistence farmers) for protection of the watershed with
pooled resources from downstream cattle ranchers and other water
users.151
D. Tradeable Development Permits
The state of New Jersey in the United States developed an inno-
vative zoning and credit program to protect a biologically unique
area known as the Pine Barrens.  The New Jersey Pinelands Commis-
sion, created through a combination of federal and state legislation,
was granted the authority to develop a comprehensive management
plan for the Pine Barrens and to establish the Pinelands Develop-
ment Credit System.152  Pursuant to the Management Plan, various
zones of use were established in the region that effectively estab-
lished three general categories of land: (1)  preservation areas that
are the most ecologically sensitive; (2) buffer zones where some eco-
nomic activity with relatively benign environmental impacts is per-
mitted; and (3) growth areas.153
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See LAURA TLAIYE & DAN BILLER, SUCCESSFUL ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS:
LESSONS FROM COLOMBIA AND CURITIBA, BRAZIL 8-17(1994).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See generally NEW JERSEY: THE PINELANDS COMM’N, THE PINELANDS DEVEL-
OPMENT CREDIT PROGRAM: TRANSFERRING RIGHTS IN NEW JERSEY’S PINELANDS (1996).
153. See id.
234 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol.  8:209
The credit program operates as follows: landowners in the more
restricted conservation zones can earn conservation credits by placing
restrictive covenants precluding development on their property.154
Land owners in the commercial growth zone can increase the density
of development on their property by purchasing conservation credits
from others. Rather than conflicting, development and conservation
stimulate and support each other.155  The state also established a bank
that can guarantee loans using credits as collateral.156  From 1982 until
1992, 10,000 acres of the Pine Barrens were protected through the
credit program, while at the same time over 180 high density devel-
opment projects moved forward.157
E. Performance Bonds
Where a proposed activity requiring government regulatory ap-
proval has uncertain environmental consequences, the government
could require the person proposing to carry out the activity to post an
environmental performance bond.  In essence, a performance bond is
a sum of money that must be deposited with a government agency
before a permit can be obtained.  The bond is set at an amount that
reflects the best estimate of the largest potential future environ-
mental damages.  The bond is returned if the developer can demon-
strate that the anticipated damages did not (and will not) occur.158
Conversely, if damages do occur, the funds are used to restore the
site, and any remaining balance is returned.  Thus the bond, if it accu-
rately reflects the true costs of reclamation, acts as a guarantee
against failure to cure environmental damage.  A performance bond
system “combines the ‘polluter pays’ principle with the
‘precautionary’ principle, providing for internalization of costs where
harm is possible but damages are uncertain.”159
Environmental performance bonds would be most successful for
projects on public lands, for projects carried out under government
154. See id.
155. See id. at 9.
156. See Jon H. Goldstein & H. Theodore Heintz, Jr., Incentives for Private Conservation of
Species and Habitat: An Economic Perspective, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 51, 57 (Wendy E. Hudson ed. 1994).
157. See id. at 57.
158. Barbara & David Webber, Promoting Economic Incentives for Environmental protec-
tion in the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: An Analysis of the Design and
Implementation of Reclamation Performance Bonds, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 389 (1985).
159. CLARK & DOWNES, supra note 3, at 58 (citing Robert Costanza and Laura Cornwell,
The 4P Approach to Dealing With Scientific Uncertainty, ENV’T, Nov. 1992, at 12).
Spring 1998] PRIVATE SECTOR CONSERVATION 235
contracts or grants, or for activities that pose obvious environmental
threats.  Categories of activities with clear potential for negative im-
pacts on biodiversity include road-building, timber-cutting, and oil-
shipping.  Performance bonds have been used in the United States
for coal-mining reclamation.160
F. Eco-Labeling
Regulated eco-labeling provides another positive incentive for
conservation.  A successful program would establish a uniform,
widely accepted, and comprehensive scheme for regulating labeling
claims.  Eco-labeling informs consumers about environmentally
sound products and production processes, empowering them to act
on their preferences for “green” products.  Eco-labeling constitutes
an advertising bonus for qualified products, and can also be a power-
ful educational tool.  To make eco-labeling effective, however, con-
sumers must be able to rely on the accuracy of labeling claims.  In in-
dustries affecting biodiversity, the government could set standards
for labels certifying, for example, that agricultural goods or forest
products were produced sustainably.  Consumers and purchasers
could then express their preferences in the market for such products,
thereby increasing market incentives for conservation.161
G. “Biodiversity Prospecting” and Other Benefit-Sharing
Mechanisms
“Biodiversity prospecting” initiatives, involving sampling species
from biodiversity-rich habitats in search of new drugs and other
products, have been widely reported by the media.162  Properly car-
ried out, these initiatives could serve as economic incentives to pro-
tect, rather than destroy, biodiversity.163  They also have the potential
to bring revenues and technological capacity to developing coun-
tries.164  Finally, they could provide a mechanism for avoiding per-
160. See id.
161. Such labeling schemes, whether voluntary or mandatory, could raise issues under the
free trade rules of the World Trade Organization to the extent that they covered imported
products.  See generally GARY COOK ET AL., APPLYING TRADE RULES TO TIMBER ECO-
LABELING: A REVIEW OF TIMBER ECOLABELING AND WTO AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL
BARRIERS TO TRADE (1997).
162. See Walter V. Reid et al., A New Lease On Life, in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING:
USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6-7 (Walter V. Reid et al. eds.
1993).
163. See id.
164. See Calestous Juma, Policy Options for Scientific and Technological Capacity-Building,
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ceived inequities of the past in which scientists  and corporations
took the knowledge and handiwork of traditional farmers and in-
digenous peoples without professional acknowledgment or financial
compensation.
Interested groups and policy-makers should develop guidelines
to ensure that biodiversity prospecting initiatives achieve their
maximum potential economic and social benefits.  For example, bio-
prospecting regulation and initiatives must address the role and rights
of indigenous communities.  For generations, many indigenous and
traditional farming cultures have effectively identified, modified, and
sustainably used resources in biodiversity-rich ecosystems, while
avoiding the massive losses to biodiversity characteristic of industrial
economies.165  In addition, the sophisticated and detailed knowledge
of the uses of local flora and fauna, characteristic of many traditional
cultures, has proven useful in providing prospecting leads for the de-
velopment of commercial products such as pharmaceuticals.166  Con-
sequently, there is a growing awareness, in some respects affirmed by
law in the Convention on Biological Diversity, that these communi-
ties should share in the benefits of the use of biodiversity found in
their territories.167  As governments implement the Convention’s pro-
visions, they should ensure that these benefit-sharing principles, as
well as other relevant principles found in the Convention, are incor-
porated into national legislation that sets guidelines for biodiversity
prospecting agreements.168
Such biodiversity prospecting guidelines should take into ac-
count the experience that is developing in a number of countries that
in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DE-
VELOPMENT 210-11 (Walter V. Reid et al. eds. 1993).
165. See Madhav Gadgil & Fikret Berkes, Traditional Resource Management Systems, 18
RESOURCE MGMT. & OPTIMIZATION 127 (1991); Margery L. Oldfield & Janis B. Alcorn, Con-
servation of Traditional Agroecosystems, in BIODIVERSITY: CULTURE, CONSERVATION AND
ECODEVELOPMENT 37 (Margery L. Oldfield & Janis B. Alcorn eds. 1991); see generally GARY
NABHAN, ENSURING SEEDS: NATIVE AMERICAN AGRICULTURE AND WILD PLANT DE-
VELOPMENT (1989).
166. See Reid et al., supra note 162, at 15; Mark Plotkin, The Outlook for New Agricultural
and Industrial Products from the Tropics, in BIODIVERSITY 106 (E.O. Wilson ed. 1988).
167. See David Downes, Global Trade, Local Ecologies, the Global Economy and the Bio-
diversity Convention, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 210
(William J. Snape ed. 1996); David Downes & Chris Wold, Biodiversity Prospecting: Rules of
the Game,  44 BIOSCI. 381 (1994).
168. See Downes, supra  note 167, at 210; Downes & Wold, supra note 167; see also
Francesca Grifo & David Downes, Agreements for Pharmaceutical Research on Biodiversity: a
Checklist of Issues and Principles, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 295 (Steven Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds. 1996).
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are exploring various approaches to bioprospecting.  Perhaps the best
known example involves the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad
(INBio) in Costa Rica, a government-chartered non-profit institution
that is inventorying the nation’s biodiversity and developing a com-
prehensive database of research results.169  INBio’s innovative meth-
ods for generating revenues from biodiversity through bioprospecting
have gained a great deal of international attention. Bioprospecting
agreements that INBio has negotiated with Merck, a U.S.-based
pharmaceutical company, provide for payments of over $1 million
dollars for access to samples of biodiversity collected by INBio.
Merck has agreed to pay a percentage of profits on any pharmaceuti-
cals developed from samples provided.
A number of bioprospecting agreements have been negotiated
and partially funded pursuant to the International Cooperative Bio-
diversity Group program, managed by the United States National In-
stitutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Agency
for International Development.  For example, an agreement among a
number of institutions in the United States and Suriname, including
Conservation International, provides for collection of samples in the
Suriname rain forests.170  Under the agreement, Bristol Myers Squibb,
a United States pharmaceutical company, will pay to the Suriname
institutions royalties equal to an agreed-upon percentage of the prof-
its from any drug based on a sample from Suriname provided under
the agreement.171  The agreement provides for both random and
“ethnobotanically-guided” sampling, the latter referring to those
samples collected based on traditional knowledge of indigenous or
local Maroon communities.172  If a drug is developed with the help of
traditional knowledge and not through random sampling, then a
higher percentage (in this case 50 percent) of those royalties which
flow back to Suriname are allocated to a locally-controlled Forest
Peoples Fund established to promote conservation and development
projects in indigenous or local Maroon communities.173
169. See Reid, supra note 162, at 1-5.
170. See generally Marianne Guérin-McManus et al., Bioprospecting in Practice: A Case
Study of the Suriname ICBG Project and Benefits Sharing under the Convention on Biological
Diversity (1998) (case study submitted to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Fourth
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, May, 1998, Bratislava, Slovakia, on file at Conserva-
tion International, Washington, D.C.).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
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H. Elimination of Perverse Incentives
Perverse incentives are those incentives that stimulate an eco-
nomic activity that results in a socially undesirable outcome, such as
biodiversity loss.174  Furthermore, they often result in government
subsidization of a damaging activity. Thus, the government has to pay
twice: once for the incentive and later to clean up the resulting dam-
age.  Elimination of such perverse incentives provides both economic
and environmental benefits to society.  However, the main obstacle
to the elimination of perverse incentives is that the social and eco-
nomic benefits of doing so are broad-based and diffuse, whereas the
loss is concentrated on a few private actors who often have consider-
able political influence.  Thus, elimination of perverse incentives will
require educating a wide range of stakeholders on the benefits of
conservation as well as the fiscal drawbacks of perverse incentives.
A number of countries have begun to eliminate such perverse
incentives in response to growing criticism.  For instance, in 1992,
Brazil eliminated a long-standing tax break that encouraged the con-
version of forested areas in Amazonia to pasture for cattle,175 while in
France, tax provisions granting a 20-year land tax exemption to farm-
ers who drained wetlands have been repealed.176
In the United States, the previous availability of inexpensive
federal flood insurance subsidized the development of ecologically
rich coastal barrier islands and associated wetlands.  The Coastal
Barrier Resources Act of 1982 eliminated this perverse incentive by
making developments on barrier islands ineligible for federal flood
insurance, thus transferring the economic risks associated with
building in a flood zone from the government to the private property
owner.177  The Act further prohibits the use of federal funds for any
development activity on barrier islands.  Thus, federal money is no
longer available for road building, water treatment plants or disaster
174. See Jim McKinney, Mark Shaffer & Jeff Olson, Economic Incentives to Preserve En-
dangered Species Habitat and Biodiversity on Private Lands, in BUILDING ECONOMIC IN-
CENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT  1, 11 (Wendy E. Hudson ed. 1994).
175. See Dennis J. Mahar, Deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon Region: Magnitude, Rate and
Causes, in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 94-98 (1994)
(available from World Bank).
176. See DE KLEMM & SHINE, supra note 3, at 241.
177. See Coastal Barrier Resources Act, Pub. L. 97-348, § 11, 96 Stat. 1659 (1992)
(amending National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, § 1321, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4028);  see
also Elise Jones, The Coastal Barrier Resources Act: A Common Cents Approach to Coastal
Protection, 21 Envtl L. 1015, 1028 (1991).
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relief.178  In addition to discouraging the destruction of barrier
beaches, the Act saves the federal government substantial amounts of
money.179  The United States made further efforts against perverse in-
centives in its farm policy by denying all federal subsidies, including
price supports, disaster relief, and crop insurance to farmers who cul-
tivate drained wetlands or highly erodible croplands.180  The United
States also revised tax laws in 1986 to ensure that farmers did not de-
duct expenses incurred in farming wetlands as business expenses.181
In many countries, however, misguided policies continue to cre-
ate perverse incentives that reduce government revenues, waste tax-
payers’ dollars, and inflict tremendous environmental costs, including
major harm to wildlife, wildlands, and biodiversity.182  Reforming
these incentives will produce major environmental and social bene-
fits.183  Analyzing destructive policies, educating the public on the im-
pacts of these policies, and mobilizing the political will for change
should all be high priorities for supporters of conservation.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are intended to summarize
some of the key ideas contained in this article.  For each of these rec-
ommended reforms, effective enforcement is critical.  Governments
must be willing to effectively evaluate proposed private conservation
actions, monitor compliance, and prosecute violations.  Provisions for
citizen involvement in monitoring and enforcement can also help to
ease the burden on regulatory agencies and increase public participa-
tion in conservation efforts.  In addition, the public, especially non-
governmental conservation organizations, must have access to infor-
mation about the policies and their application and the right to bring
legal actions to enforce conservation commitments.
A. Legal Mechanisms for Land Conservation
Develop legal mechanisms that allow landowners to ensure con-
servation on their lands for the long term.  Combine these measures
with the tax incentives discussed below.
178. See Jones, supra note 177,  at 1032-34.
179. See Jones, supra note 177, at 1030; CLARK & DOWNES, supra note 3, at 37.
180. See CLARK & DOWNES, supra note 3, at 37.
181. See 26 U.S.C. § 175 (1994).
182. See McKinney, Shaffer & Olson, supra note 174.
183. Id..
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1. Conservation Easements
Consider passing legislation that allows the use of conservation
easements, specifying that landowners may sell or donate a part of
their ownership rights (such as the right to carry out certain types of
development), while retaining other ownership rights (such as the
right to reside on or visit the property).  Legislation on conservation
easements should include the following elements: (1) the recipient
need not be the owner of an adjacent parcel of land; (2) the recipient
must be a qualified conservation organization or government agency
(with the commitment and ability to conserve the land indefinitely
into the future); (3) the easement must “run with the land,” (i.e. if the
owner sells the land, the land is still subject to the easement and the
new owner is automatically bound by it); (4) the easement should be
judicially enforceable at the request of the easement holder as well as
by the appropriate government agency and the public.
2. Conservation Agreements
Establish guidelines for conservation agreements in which land-
owners contract with a government agency or conservation organiza-
tion to manage their land so as to conserve wildlife, biodiversity or
natural habitat, or lands of cultural or aesthetic significance.  These
guidelines should allow flexibility in individual arrangements, but
should set minimum standards of qualification.
3. Land Exchanges
Develop a policy for promoting exchanges of public and private
lands with the goal of efficiently protecting biologically valuable
lands for the public interest. The policy should include procedures
for: (1) scientific and economic assessment of lands proposed for ex-
change; (2) full disclosure of information on proposed and completed
exchanges; and (3) judicial review of transactions.
4. Public Participation and Judicial Review
Establish procedures for involving the public and appropriate
government agencies, such as conservation agencies and the attorney
general, in monitoring and enforcement of conservation easements,
agreements, and land exchanges.  There should be provisions for ju-
dicial review and enforcement, including citizen’s enforcement suits.
B. Tax Incentives for Private Conservation Action
Develop a tax structure that encourages charitable giving for
conservation, especially donations of land for conservation.  The fol-
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lowing are examples of tax incentives for conservation:
1. Income Tax Deduction for Donations of Cash and Property
Allow a donor to deduct all or part of the value of a charitable
contribution of cash, or land, or other property to a qualified conser-
vation organization from the donor’s taxable income.
2. Income Tax Deduction for Easement Donations
Provide specifically that the deduction for charitable contribu-
tions (see above) applies to donations of conservation easements to
qualified conservation organizations.
3. Estate Tax Exemption for Land Conservation
If land or a conservation easement is transferred from the estate
to a qualified conservation organization or appropriate government
agency, the value of the interest transferred should be deducted from
the value of the estate for purposes of tax assessment.  There must
also be procedures for ensuring that the land involved is important
for conservation purposes.
4. Property Tax Adjustments for Conservation Easements and
Agreements
When a landowner donates a conservation easement, or enters
into a conservation agreement, ensure that the landowner’s property
is taxed at a rate according to its current market value (its value sub-
ject to the easement or the agreement), rather than its potential de-
velopment value.  Landowners could also receive additional property
tax reductions established by regulation for transferring easements or
forming conservation agreements (as defined by law).
C. Tax Incentives for Sustainable Use
Explore development of a tax structure that provides incentives
for sustainable use of natural resources, and for resource use that
conserves biodiversity, including crop genetic diversity.  For example,
the government could allow tax deductions for farmers using socially
beneficial techniques such as: (1) methods that preserve riparian
edges, wildlife habitat, or wetlands; (2) traditional or “heirloom” va-
rieties of crops; or (3) low-impact farming methods that minimize
pesticide use or otherwise reduce damage to natural resources.
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D. Protection of Common Resources
Ensure regulation of common property resources to avoid over-
exploitation and create incentives for conservation.  One way to do
this is to provide legal recognition and protection of traditional com-
mon property resource management systems that are sustainable.
The establishment of secure land title systems is also important.  In
other cases, the creation of limited private property rights, combined
with other measures, may be part of the conservation solution.
E. Environmental Performance Bonds
Require that proponents of environmentally damaging enter-
prises, such as mining, timber harvesting, and road building, post per-
formance or assurance bonds.  In order to be effective, bonds must be
set at a level which accurately reflects all anticipated environmental
damages that could result.  Government agencies must monitor and
enforce compliance effectively.  The bonds must be held long enough
to ensure the proponents have complied with their obligations.  Of
course, if proponents follow environmental guidelines and minimize
harm to biodiversity or wildlife, they should recoup the full value of
the bonds at the end of the specified period.  Environmental per-
formance bonds are a practical application of the “precautionary
principle,” which states that those who propose an activity that risks
environmental harm have the burden of ensuring that the harm is
avoided or remedied.184
F. User Fees on Resource Consumption
Collect taxes or user fees on all consumptive or damaging re-
source uses, including recreation, to capture the environmental costs
associated with resource degradation.  Fees collected should be ear-
marked for conservation purposes, such as the purchase of conserva-
tion easements or the establishment of conservation trusts.  However,
the administering agency should not rely on such fees alone for its
expenses, because this could create an incentive for the agency to en-
courage more intensive resource use rather than conservation in or-
der to increase its income.  In addition, governments could also con-
184
 See Elli Louka, Cutting the Gordian Knot: Why International Environmental
Law is Not Only About the Protection of the Environment, 10 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 79, 82 (1996).
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sider transaction fees on certain activities such as real estate sales to
generate additional funds for conservation.
G. Eliminate Subsidies for Destructive Activities
Eliminate subsidies or preferential tax provisions encouraging
destructive activities that harm wildlife, biodiversity, or wildlands.
Examples of types of subsidies that could be eliminated include: (1)
below-market or less than full cost pricing of public natural resources
such as minerals or timber; (2) below-market rate loans or direct
payments to farmers for expanding production of crops on acreage
that displaces natural habitat; (3) favorable tax treatment for unsus-
tainable extraction of natural resources; and (4) grants or below-
market rate loans to support construction that destroys biodiversity.
